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The research presents an analysis of the technical, legal and economic implications generated due the change in regulating 
for the remuneration of the electricity transmission sector in Colombia. Economic comparisons are made of the existing 
and the proposal methodology by the regulatory authority in the electricity sector in Colombia. The results allow to identify 
the technical-economic impact generated in the companies of the transmission sector and to the users. Finally, it can be 
concluded that the change in remuneration will not affect the returns of investment in companies and will encourage the 
improvement of their electric assets and the quality of service. 
 





The National Interconnected System (NIS) is the 
infrastructure that allows the electric power to be carried long 
distances from the generation points; its planning and growth 
is of vital importance for the expansion of the generation 
system, bringing the service to non-interconnected zones and 
improving the reliability of the service [1, 2, 3].  
 The National Transmission System (NTS) of Colombian 
is built in its entirety throughout the mountainous region, it 
has international interconnections with Ecuador and 
Venezuela [4], and it has approximately 15223.88 km of 
transmission networks [5]. The NTS began in 1967, with the 
creation of the company Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA), 
responsible for the construction, maintenance and 
administration of the transmission network [6]. 
 The transmission activity is considered as a natural 
monopoly [7], due to the technical-economic inefficiency 
when there are two or more operators in a defined 
geographical area; currently in Colombia there are 16 
registered companies that carry out the transmission activity 
[8], one of them, ISA owns 77.18% of the network's activities 
[9], at the beginning ISA was the state company in charge for 
the construction of the transmission system and due to the 
reform of the electricity market with the law 142 of 1994 and 
143 of 1994, the guarantee of exceeding participation limits 
was given [10]. 
 The projects of the electricity sector are proposed by the 
Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética (UPME), Energy 
Mining Planning Unit, they are offered by public auction 
seeking the greatest benefit for users [11]; in the case of 
transmission sector, projects that do not have bidders and be 
necessary will be awarded to the company ISA [12], likewise, 
ISA must present a proposal for each of the projects defined 
in the calls [13], increasing the participation in the 
transmission sector. 
 The electricity sector is regulated by Comisión de 
Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) [14], Energy and Gas 
Regulatory Commission, the Law 143 assigned it the function 
of establishing the methodology for the calculation of the 
tariffs for the use of electricity networks [12, 15], under a 
model of free competition [16], these payments are collected 
on the electricity bill of end users. 
The Colombian NTS is presenting faults such as low 
voltages, overloads in transformation assets, exhaustion of 
transformation capacity and radial connection in some areas 
of the NIS [3]. The departments in the north of Colombia are 
the most affected due to the depletion in the transformation 
capacity of the NTS [3], 2 of the 12 projects approved for the 
NTS expansion of this area were declared deserts [3, 17]; 
these projects would allow a better performance, eliminate 
restrictions and also allows greater flexibility in the operation, 
decreasing the final price of electricity [18]. 
 To encourage investment in the sector, increase the 
expansion of the NTS, improve reliability and intensify the 
participation of more companies, it was proposed to change 
the regulation that defines the remuneration of the 
transmission activity. The objective of the research is to make 
a comparison between resolutions CREG 011 of 2009 and 
CREG 178 of 2014, which will allow identifying the technical 
and economic implications it could have for the electricity 
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2. Materials and methods 
 
2.1. Regulation of electricity in Colombia 
The electricity sector is governed by Law 143 of 1994 [12] 
and Law 142 of 1994 [14] because it is a public service; 
CREG is the entity in charge of regulation, it must establish 
new formulas for tariff structures to the end-users bills; 
concepts such as generation, transmission, distribution and 
commercialization. This regulation should look for a value 
that allows companies to ensure adequate compensation, 
improve the reliability of the service and be accessible to 
users [19]; these tariff formulas are valid for 5 years, once this 
period expires, they will remain valid until a new 
methodology is established [14]. The price of electricity in 
Colombia is structured by Resolution CREG 119 of 2007, 
where the following charges are collected: 
 
𝐶𝑈# = 𝐺 + 𝑇 + 𝐷 + 𝐶# + 𝑃𝑅 + 𝑅    (1) 
 
 
 At where, 𝐶𝑈# is the unit cost of one kWh ($/kWh); G is 
the purchase cost of electricity produced by the generation 
plants ($/kWh); T is the cost per use of the NTS ($/kWh); D 
is cost for use of the Distribution System ($/kWh); C is the 
energy trading profit ($/kWh) and the following charges are 
for the reliable and safe operation of the electric power 
system, PR is the cost of energy losses due to the operation of 
the electric power system ($/kWh); and R is the cost due to 
the restrictions planned to improve the reliability of the 
service ($/kWh). 
 Each component has its methodology to determine the 
value, for the case of transmission, Resolution CREG 011 of 
2009 is used, where the installed equipments and the expense 
associated with the Administration, Operation and 
Maintenance (AOM) of the assets is remunerated; however, 
the growth of the networks has not increased as expected, to 
overcome this drawback, CREG proposes to change the 
methodology with Resolution CREG 178 of 2014, in order to 
optimize costs and encourage investors. 
 UPME is the entity responsibility for designing the 
expansion plans of the NTS [20], and it is advised by the 
Comité Asesor de Planeamiento de la Transmisión (CAPT), 
Transmission Planning Advisory Committee, to establish the 
most efficient strategies according to the requirements of the 
demand. A model is used to simulate the operation of the 
electric power system under different scenarios, which allows 
identifying problems that affect the quality and reliability of 
the service, and verify the performance of the equipment; the 
results allow the design of strategies such as the repowering 
of the infrastructure, installation of backup equipment, 
installation of new equipment for the expansion of the 
electrical system [21]. The projects are evaluated to determine 
the technical and economic feasibility; then they are offered 
through competitive bidding processes, and according to the 
execution priority their planning horizon is determined, long 
term (15 years), medium term (10 years) and short term (5 
years) [3]. 
 
2.2. Methods of incentive regulation for transmission 
projects 
Transmission activity is established as a natural monopoly 
[7], and regulation is essential to set an optimal price [7]; this 
activity can be developed under three types of systems: the 
first, a centralized and regulated approach, the second 
analyzes market signals and a decentralized approach and the 
third is a hybrid of the previous mechanisms [21]; regulated 
systems do not create sufficient incentives for their expansion 
while market-based models do not fully remunerate the costs 
[7]. 
 There are different methods to incentive the activity of 
transmission, each having advantages and disadvantages with 
regard to the agents and the market [22]. In Table 1 shows 
some methods. 
 
Table 1. Methods of incentive regulation 
Method Remarks 
Price Cap 
It allows the regulator to impose a price control on the 
regulated for a period of time; the income of the national 
transmitter will be independent of the demand and only 
depends on the investments made. 
It encourages productive efficiency due to reduce 
historical and AOM costs. 
It includes a measure of inflation and compensation, 
restricting the increase in prices. 





The income of the company is limited and adjusted 
according to an efficiency factor. 
It ensures the return of investment and profit. 
It provides incentives to encourage investment in 
electric assets. 
It is sensitive to inflation, causing fluctuations in market 




It set an average rate and the annual income should not 
exceed the maximum income. 
It improves the surplus due to the increase of the 
transmission capacity. 
To calculate the price index, it is only necessary to know 
the demand, an incentive is provided to reduce costs. 
Yardstick 
Competition 
It compare the performance of a company against 
similar companies in the sector, which allows improving 
the efficiency of the system. 
Companies receive an incentive for the implementation 
of new technologies. 
The competition is given through a "shadow company" 
that is built from the costs of the group of companies. 
Source: [7, 22-31] [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] [31, 22, 32] [7] 
 
2.3. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
The WACC is the weighted average rate of return required by 
those who provide capital, also called the discount rate or the 
cost of capital [33], it is used in companies to determine the 
economic viability of expansion opportunities [34]. Through 
Resolution CREG 083 of 2008, this method is approved for 
the calculation of the rate of return. The equation used to 
calculate the WACC is (2). 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶-./. = 𝑤1𝑟1 +
3454
(789)
                                                (2) 
 
 At where; 𝑤1 is the cost of debt, ratio of debt to total assets 
40%; 𝑟1 is the cost of debt; 𝑤< is the participation of own 
capital, proportion of own capital versus total assets 60%; 𝑟< 
is the cost of own capital or equity; and 𝜏 is the tax rate. CREG 
uses the rate of return before tax, to do not incur in financial 
decisions of the companies, the value of this rate is 11.50% 
[35]. 
 
2.4. Legal framework for the remuneration of the 
transmission activity. 
The current resolution and the proposed resolution for the 
remuneration of the transmission activity established by 
CREG are detailed. 
 
2.4.1. Resolution CREG 011 of 2009 
The transmission activity is paid by the Revenue Cap 
Regulation method, the annual income for each National 
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Transmitter (NT) is calculated with equation (3), and it is 
applied to the existing electricity transport assets that operate 
at equal or higher voltages at 220 kV; taking into account the 
construction units valued at efficient cost of replacement, the 
recognition of non-electric assets, administration, operation 
and maintenance (AOM) expenses and the recognition of land 
for the constructive units (UC) of substations. 
 
𝐼𝐴𝑇? = 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝐴?(1 +%𝐴𝑁𝐸) + 𝑉𝐴𝑂𝑀? + 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑇? +
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑆? − 𝑂𝑙?	                                                                    (3) 
 
 At where; 𝐼𝐴𝑇? is the annual income of the NT ($); 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝐴? 
is the annual equivalent cost of the electric asset valued at 
replacement cost ($); %𝐴𝑁𝐸 ANE is the percentage 
recognized for non-electric assets; 𝑉𝐴𝑂𝑀? is the value of 
AOM expenses ($); 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑇? is the annual equivalent cost of 
land for NT ($); 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑆? is the annual equivalent cost of 
easements for NT ($); and 𝑂𝑙? are other income from the 
exploitation of the assets remunerated through charges for use 
in activities other than the transmission of electric power. 
 






\                                                         (4) 
 
 At where; 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝐴? is the annual equivalent cost of the 
electric asset valued at replacement cost ($); 𝑁𝑈𝐶/ is the 
amount of each UC reported by the NT; 𝐶𝑈/ is the unit cost 
of each UC; 𝑃𝑈?,/ is the percentage paid to the NT, through 
charges for the use of UC; 𝑅𝑃𝑃?,/ is the fraction that is 
calculated from the part of the UC value that should not be 
included in the calculation of the tariff, with respect to the 
total value of the UC; 𝑇𝑅 is the rate of return; y 𝑉𝑈/ is the 
useful life of the UC. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑇? = %𝑅∑ (𝐴𝑇𝑈𝐶/)(𝑉𝐶𝑇 )
-S
/T7                                  (5) 
 
 At where; 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑇? is the annual equivalent cost of land for 
NT ($); %𝑅 is the value equal to the real cost of debt included 
in the rate of return (TR); 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝐶/ is the area of the UC; 𝑉𝐶𝑇  
is the cadastral value of the square meter of the substation 
area, where the UC is located; and 𝑈𝑅? is the total number of 
UC reported by the NT. 
 
2.4.2. Resolution CREG 178 of 2014 
This is the proposal for the change of Resolution CREG 011 
of 2009, it is in consultation with industrialists and other 
stakeholders. Its objectives are to encourage the replacement 
of assets, improve the quality of service, achieve efficient 
AOM expenses, allow investment stability and obtain 
competitive rates [36, 37]. The annual income for NT is 
calculated according to (6). 
 
𝐼𝐴𝑇?,` = 𝐼𝐴𝐴?,` + 𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑀?,` + 𝐼𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶?,` − 𝑂𝑙?                 (6) 
  
 At where; 𝐼𝐴𝑇?,` is the annual income of the NT in the year 
t; 𝐼𝐴𝐴?,` is the annual income from investment in NT assets in 
the year t; 𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑀?,` is the annual incentive income of AOM 
of NT in the year t; 𝐼𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐶?,` is the annual incentive income 
of the NT in the year t; and	𝑂𝑙? are income from the 
exploitation of the assets remunerated through charges for use 
in activities other than the transmission of electricity. 
 The expression (7) is used to calculate the annual 
investment income of the NT: 
 
𝐼𝐴𝐴?,` = 𝐵𝑅𝐴?,` ∗ 𝑟 + 𝑅𝐶?,` + 𝐵𝑅𝑇?,`																																				(7) 
 
 At where; 𝐼𝐴𝐴?,` is the annual investment income of the 
NT;	𝐵𝑅𝐴?,` is the NT regulatory asset base; 𝑟 is the rate of 
return; 𝑅𝐶?,` is the recognized capital recovery for the assets 
remunerated in the NT regulatory base; and 𝐵𝑅𝑇?,` is the 





3.1.1. Comparison of resolutions CREG 011 of 2009 and 
CREG 178 of 2014. 
The change of scheme encourages companies to invest in the 
replacement and repowering of their electric assets, through 
incentives and penalties depending on their efficiency in 
investment and operation; seeking to achieve a reduction in 
costs, improve the quality of service and stimulate 
investment, this will lead to a more competitive and fair price 
for users [38]. 
 The efficiency is determine by the investment value of the 
company in comparison with the base value defined by the 
CREG and by the quality of the service according to the hours 
of availability, CREG fixes the maximum number of hours of 
unavailability. This will encourage companies to carry out 
strategic planning to improve their investments and 
preventive and corrective maintenance plans. Table 2 presents 
a comparison between the resolutions CREG 011 of 2009 and 
CREG 178 of 2014, the change of methodology will lead to 
an optimization of the resources looking for the efficiency in 
investment and operation of their electrical assets. 
 
3.1.2. Economic assessment of resolutions CREG 011 of 
2009 and CREG 178 of 2014. 
It is consider the project STN06-2013 (Flores, Caracolí, 
Sabanalarga) developed by Intercolombia [38] to make an 
economic assessment with the resolutions, this project 
contains the assembly of the Caracolí Electrical Substation 
(ES) at 220 kV, the extension of Termoflores ES, the 
extension of Sabanalarga ES and the construction of 58 km of 
overhead lines and 5 km of underground lines; it has a value 
of 61.28 MMUSD, this plan will improve the reliability of the 
service in the region, mainly in the cities of Barranquilla, 
Soledad, Malambo and Sabanalarga. With equations (2) to (7) 
assessed it the behavior of NT income, using 14.27% as the 
value of the WACC before tax expressed in dollars. Figure 1 
presents the behavior of the CAEA, this variable represents 
75.36% of the annual income of the NT, when the rate of 
return varies 0.27%. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The behavior of CAEA. 
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 Figure 1 indicates that the CAEA has an increasing 
behavior as the value of the rate of return increases; a change 
of 0.27% in the rate of return will represent a change in the 
CAEA of 2.14% (6.79 MMUSD) in the equivalent annual 
cost; Indicating that the rate of return is of great importance 
for the annual income of the agents. 
 Resolution CREG 059 of 2017 updates the electric assets 
base of ISA, this indicates the total amount of investments 
made by this company and is identified as the Asset 
Replacement Cost; with this value, the annual income of this 
company is evaluated using the methodology of resolution 
CREG 011 of 2009 and resolution CREG 178 of 2014. 
 The following consideration are taken, it is consider an 
increase of 5% of the Regulatory Base of New Electric Assets, 
it remain constant the cost of the Regulatory Base of Electric 
Assets that come out of operation and it is considered a useful 
life of 45 years, there is no depreciation of the assets at the 
beginning, because all the assets are new; this last aspect is 
the most important one change in the new regulatory 
framework. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the annual income 
received. 
 
Table 2. Comparison between the resolutions CREG 011 of 2009 and CREG 178 of 2014. 
Items Resolution CREG 011 of 2009 Resolution CREG 178 of 2014 
Method Revenue Cap Regulation Revenue Cap Regulation 
Asset valuation 
method 
New Replacement Value (VNR) 
It does not take into account the useful life of the 
electric asset and they are remunerated as new. 
Depreciated Optimized Replacement Cost (DORC) 
It takes into account the useful life and remnant of 
the assets. 
AOM The AOM costs are those recognized and spent by each National Transmitter 
The AOM costs are those recognized from the 
investments and incentives received from the 
National Transmitter. 
Investments A new value of the investments is obtained every five years. 
A new value of the investments is obtained every 
year. 
Non-electric 
assets Proportional recognition of electric assets (5%). Proportional recognition of electric assets (2%). 
Quality of 
service 
The quality indexes are obtained from the historical 
information of the service. 
There is a maximum value of unavailability. 
When the National Transmitter exceeds the 
maximum unavailability value, it must include 
compensation, which is reflected in the energy 
service bill. 
The quality indexes are obtained from the efficient 
data of the service. 
It is proposed to modify the maximum allowed 
annual hours of unavailability (decrease). 
When the National Transmitter exceeds the 
maximum unavailability value, it must include 





Fig. 2. Comparison of Annual Income according to resolutions CREG 
011 of 2009 and CREG 178 of 2014 
 
 Figure 2 presents the annual income of ISA calculated 
according to resolution CREG 011 of 2009 (light gray) and 
resolution CREG 178 of 2014 (dark gray); with the 
implementation of the new methodology there will be a better 
management of costs due to the consideration of the useful 
life of the assets and the return of the investments made by 
each agent is guaranteed. 
 For the first year with the proposed methodology, the 
agent will receive an increase in their income of 2.40% or 
USD 8,432,570, represented by the dashed red line; however, 
at 1.53 years, your income will be equal to the current 
resolution of USD 342,330,813, for year 5 total revenue will 
decrease by 6.72% or USD 115,064,843, represented by the 
green dotted line. 
 The difference in the agent's annual income due to the 
change in the regulation is USD 106,632,273, mainly due to 
the consideration of the depreciation of the installed assets; 
this amount would represent a decrease in the contributions 
that users must make in the payment of their electricity bill in 
the concept of transmission of equation (1). 
 Annual income also depends on the declaration of 
expenses executed and declared, according to these values 
may access an incentive or a penalty due to compliance, this 
is represented by a percentage; the agents must implement 
alternatives to generate higher revenues such as the 
replacement of electrical assets and increasing the capacity of 
energy transport [39]. The quality of the service will be 
evaluated according to the number of hours in unavailability, 
amount established by the CREG; the SAIDI indicator 
(System Average Interruption Duration Indicator) is taken to 





The resolution proposal by CREG has the necessary 
mechanisms to encourage companies to invest in their electric 
assets and make a more efficient use of AOM expenses, to 
achieve competitive rates and sustainability for companies. 
 Table 2 presents the most important differences between 
the two resolutions, there will be an evaluation of the 
performance using the SAIFI indicator and the depreciation 
of the assets will be taken into account, guaranteeing 
remuneration for the companies and a fairer charge for end-
users. 
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 The value considered for the rate of return will be the 
determinant in the increases or decreases in the annual income 
of each company in the transmission sector; this rate takes 
into account the capital invested according to the risk of the 
activity. 
This new proposal will encourage companies to invest 
frequently in their electric assets, to achieve greater increase 
in the concepts of annual investment income. In order to 
obtain a greater benefit, the efficiency and quality of the 
service provided must be improved. 
 The economic evaluation made it possible to establish the 
Annual Income of ISA, and to determine the monetary and 
percentage changes in concepts of Annual Income, presenting 
an increase of 2.40% for the first year and a decrease of 6.72% 
for following years. This difference represents a saving to the 
end-users of the electricity service; this decrease in revenues 
should not be consider as losses for companies, because by 
law the return on investment of agents and a payment based 
on the risk of the activity is guaranteed, it should be 
understood that it is a mechanism to obtain real and 
competitive rates. 
 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 
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